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'l1REU
[Sac. No. 6282.

V. KIRKWOOD

In Bank.

[42 0.2d

Apr. 1, 1954.]

F'LORENZ TREU, Respondent, v. ROBERT C. KIRKWOOD,
as State Controller, et al., Appellants.
[1] Public

to Compel Payment
-Pleading-Variance.-In mandamus proceeding to compel
payment of noncivil service employee's claim against the state
for compensating time off which employee alleged was promised
her for overtime hours worked in addition to her normal hours
of work in office of lieutenant governor, the alleged promise
is not established by proof that she was told that it would be
impossible for her to take any time off because of increased
amount of work, and that promise made to her was that she
should be paid for overtime.
[2] Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-Variance and Proof.
-Under Code Civ. Proc., §§ 469,475, and Const., art. VI,§ 4%,
not every variance between pleading and proof necessitates
reversal of a judgment, but only where there has been a miscarriage of justice or substantial rights of appellant have been
affected thereby.
[3] Public Officers-Compensation-Mandamus to Compel Payment
-Pleading-Variance.-In mandamus proceeding to compel
state controller and state treasurer to pay employee's claim
against state for compensating time off, respondents were not
misled to their prejudice by a variance in petition alleging
promise by 1lieutenant governor to give petitioner such time
off for overtime hours worked and proof that she was not
promised time off but was promised that she would be paid for
overtime, where they anticipated proof of a contract for payment for overtime work and introduced evidence to show that
no such contract had been approved, and where petition,
liberally construed, demanded payment for overtime work for
which compensation in some form had been promised.
[4] Id.--Compensation-Terminology.-The words "salary" and
"compensation" are, in general usage, interchangeable and are
synonymous in most definitions, and while term "salary" in its
original and strict sense signifies a fixed compensation, it is
frequently used in our Constitution and laws as equivalent of
"compensation."
[5] Id.- Compensation- Terminology. -Reading Gov. Code,
~ 18004, requiring approval of Department of Finance before
[ 4] See Am.Jur., Public Officers, § 340.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3] Public O.fficers, § 116(5); [2] Appeal and Error, § 1521; [ 4, 5, 7, 8, 10] Public 0 fficers, § 97; [ 6]
State of California, § 18; [9] Public Officers, ~§ 116(5), 116(6);
[11] Appeal and Error,§ 1230(2) (6).
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or compensation of an employee,
any state agency fixes
and "compensation" are there
it is obvious that words
used as being synonymous.
[6] State of California-Fiscal Matters.-The purpose of Gov.
to Department of Finance
powers
Code, § 13070,
of supervision over nwtters concerning financial and business
policies of the
is to conserve financial interests of the
state, to prevent
and to control expenditure of
state money
any state department.
[7] Public Officers-Compensation-Validity of Contracts Governing.-A contract fixing matters relating to pay and working
conditions of a state employee which has not been approved by
Department of Finance in accordance with Gov. Code, § 18004,
is invalid.
[8] !d.-Compensation-Validity of Contracts Governing.-Under
Gov. Code, § 13370, declaring that all contracts entered into
by a state agency for services are of no effect unless approved
by Department of Finance, a contract to pay secretary of
lieutenant governor for her services beyond normal working
hours, regardless of whether payment be considered "compensation" or "salary" or both, is invalid if lacking approval
by department.
[9a, 9b] Id.- Compensation- Mandamus to Compel PaymentPleading: Hearing-Findings.--Where conflicting inferences
could he drawn from evidence as to whether Department of
Pimmce had approveil claim of secretary of lieutenant governor
for additional compt>nsation for overtime work, and where this
issue was essential to a determination of mandamus proceeding
to compel state controller and state treasurer to pay such
claim, shP should have alleged in petition for mandate that
her claim was for overtime approved by Department of Finance
and such issue should have been determined by the findings.
[10] Id.- Compensation- Overtime.-Where monthly salary of
secretary of lieutenant governor is payment in full for all of
her services, without regard to number of hours which she
worked, she is not entitled, in absence of a valid contract or
statute, to payment for overtime.
and Taking Evidence.-Although
[11] Appeal-Making
an appellate court is empowered to make findings of fact and
to take evidence in gupport of a judgment (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 956a), generally it will not do so when evidence before trial
court is conflicting; and where evidence in favor of one party
is not clearly persuasive and there is no indication as to trial
judge's appraisal of evidence, the judgment should be reversed
[10] See Cal.Jur., Public Ofil.cers, § 106; Am.Jur., Public Officers,
§ 341 et seq.
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for a new trial in order that there rnay he a

[42 C.2d
on the
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~1\.PPEAL

from a

in mandamus to
overtime worked by former
Judgment
writ reversed.
Edmund G.
and Marcus
A.ppellants.

Court of
allowance of claim for
of lieutenant governor.

General, for

James H. Phillips for R.espondent.
EDMONDS, J.-From 1947 to 1949, Florenz 'freu was a
noncivil service employee in the ofiice of the lieutenant governor. By writ of mandate, the state controller and the
treasurer have been ordered to approve and pay her claim
''for overtime worked . . . for which petitioner was not compensated and was not given compensating time off.'' The
appeal is from that judgment.
In her petition for a writ of mandate, Miss Treu alleged that,
prior to the time the ·work 'Nas performed, the lieutenant governor had established normal offiee hours and promised her
compensating time off for work
those hours. All overtime work was authorized by the lieutenant governor, she said,
and she did not receive time off or any other compensation
for such work, nor was any offered to or refused by her. According to the petitioner, a
claim for the cash equivalent of the accumulated overtime hours at the time of her
separation was filed by the lieutenant governor and approved
for payment by the State Personnel Board, but the controller
refused to issue a warrant.
By their answer, the controller and treasurer denied that
any amount was due for overtime.
alleged that Miss
'l'reu was exempt from, and never held a position in, the state
civil service. Her salary,
said, was fixed
the lieutenant
governor with the approval of the Department of Finance at a
monthly rate which was
in full and no salary or compensation on any other basis, or in any form other than cash, was
authorized by the department.
Miss 'l'reu was appointed secretary to the lieutenant governor
on March 1, 1947, in which capacity she served for one year.
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She then became executive secretary. Her employment was
terminated by resignation on August 1, 1949. In both positions she was exempt from civil service. During her employment, her
fixed on a monthly basis with the approval
of the Department of Finance, progressively increased from
$275 to $436 per month.
·when Miss Treu commenced her work for the lieutenant
governor, he fixed office hours from 9 a.m. to 5 :30 p.m. on week
and from 9 a. m. to noon on Saturdays. At the beginof her employment, he told her, she testified, ''that there
was a terrific amount of work in the office and he knew I was
going to work a lot of overtime, and that I was going to be
paid for the overtime that I worked.'' She was informed'' that
she would be paid for the overtime as it would be impossible
for her to take any time off because of the increased amount
of work.''
Thereafter, the lieutenant governor wrote to the Department
of Finance requesting a salary increase for his staff upon the
basis that two employees "have taken over and are doing the
work that a staff of three people performed previous to my
administration. Because of their willingness to assume this
additional responsibility, I feel they should be compensated
accordingly.'' He suggested that the appropriation for his
office was sufficient to increase their salaries and stated: ''I do
not intend to further add to my staff as long as Mr. Mydland
and Miss Treu continue doing the work that has required three
people.'' In response to this request, the director of finance
approved a salary increase for Miss Treu. .All of her salary
was paid in full.
Prior to the filing of the claim which is the basis of this proceeding, the Department of Finance had not fixed or approved
salary or compensation for Miss Treu on other than a monthly
basis, or in amounts different than her agreed monthly salary,
nor did it approve compensation in any form other than cash
or fix normal working hours for her. .An official record was
maintained in the lieutenant governor's office showing hours
which she worked in addition to normal office hours . .All such
work was authorized by the lieutenant governor, and she was
at no time granted compensating time off for these hours.
Upon her separation from service, a claim for payment for
overtime was approved by the State Personnel Board. While
the claim was pending in the controller's office, a letter from
the attorney general was forwarded to the controller by the
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director of finance. The attorney general's letter set forth
seven facts upon which it said the validity of the claim would
depend. Among these were that the lieutenant governor had
established normal hours of work for Miss Treu and that he
promised her compensating time off for extra hours worked.
The covering letter from the director of finance stated that:
''The seven items . . .
have been substantiated, and
there is available in our files the required letters and affidavits
making the required substantiation." Thereafter, the claim
was rejected by the controller and this proceeding was commenced.
Upon this
the trial court found the allegations
of the petition to be true. Judgment was entered directing
that a peremptory writ of mandate issue commanding the
respondents to approve and pay her claim.
In support of their appeal, the respondents contend that
the finding that Miss Treu was promised compensating time off
for overtime work is not supported by the evidence. In addition, they say, the judgment may not be sustained upon the
theory of a contract to pay cash compensation for overtime
\YOrk because no such contract was approved by the department
of finance as required by statute. They argue that, in the
absence of either a valid contract or a statutory provision, Miss
'l'reu 's monthly salary was payment in full for all of her
services during each month, regardless of the number of hours
worked. Other objections made by the respondents are that
the trial court failed to find upon certain material issues and
that other findings are not supported by the evidence. This
court is requested to make findings of fact to conform to the
proof. A final contention is that, even if Miss Treu is entitled
to a cash payment for overtime work, it should be computed
upon the basis of her salary at the time the work was performed, rather than her salary at the time of separation.
Miss Treu relies upon Howard v. Lampton, 87 Cal.App.2d
449 [197 P.2d 69], and Clm·lc v. State Personnel Board, 56
Cal.App.2d 499 [133 P.2d 11], holding that in the absence of
statute, a state employee is entitled to payment upon separation from service for properly authorized overtime work. She
also contends that a promise of compensating time off is not
a prerequisite to payment for overtime. Even if it is, she says,
the promise by the lieutenant governor to pay her for overtime work may be construed as a promise to give her compensating time off. In addition, she disputes each of the other
contentions of the respondents.
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In Martin v. Henderson and Heclwine v.
40 Cal.
P.2d
Howard and Clark decisions
authority, is entitled
to payment for accrued overtime upon separation from service.
Therefore, the
here is whether there was contractual
or statutory authority for payment to Miss Treu for overtime
services.
[1] 'l'he petition specifically alleges a promise by the lieutenant governor to give Miss Treu ''compensating time off for
overtime hours worked in addition to her normal hours of
work.'' 'l'he court found that the promise was made. However, the letter from the lieutenant governor to the Department of Finance and Miss 'l'reu 's own testimony, shows conclusively that she was not promised time off. She was told that
"it would be impossible for her to take any time off because
of the increased amount of work'' The promise made to her
was ''that she would be paid for the overtime.''
The respondents contend that this amounted to a failure of
proof within the meaning of section 471 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, rather than a mere variance. They rely upon
Gillin v. Hopkins, 28 Cal.App. 579, 580-582 [153 P. 724], which
held that evidence of a contract to accept payment in stock
constituted failure of proof of a cause of action upon an agreement to pay a designated sum of money. The situation is
analogous to that here. Obviously, a promise to grant compensating time off is far different from a promise to pay cash
for overtime work. However," (n)o variance between the allegation in a pleading and the proof is to be deemed material,
unless it has actually misled the adverse party to his prejudice
in maintaining his action or defense upon the merits.'' (Code
Civ. Proc. § 469.)
[2] "The code also provides that the court must, in every
stage of an action (and that means ou appeal, as well as in
the trial of the cause), disregard any error, improper ruling
or defect in the pleadings or proceedings, which, in the opinion
of the court, does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.
It must appear from the record that the error, improper ruling
or defect was prejudicial and caused substantial injury before
the judgment rendered may be reversed or be held to be affected
by it; and it must further appear that a different result would
have been probable if such error, ruling or defect had not
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occurred or exisLed. (Code
§ '175.) Not
do
these code sections
this
under such eircumto determine from an examination of the entire record,
whether or not there has been a
of justice before
reversing a judgment, but the state constitution is equally mandatory and imperative. ( Const. §
art. VI.) It therefore
indubitably follovvs that it is not every variance that will necessitate the overthrow of a
"
v. Le JYlesnager, 207 Cal. 485, 495 [279 P. 800].)
It is obvious from a review of the record in this case
that the respondents were not misled to their prejudice. They
anticipated proof of a contract for payment for overtime work
and introduced evidence to show that no such contract had
been approved. In addition, the
adequately apprised
the respondents of the claim which
would he ealled upon
to meet. It alleged that "at the time of said separation from
said State employment petitioner herein had accumulated and
was entitled to be
in cash
the State of California for
overtime worked while an
of the said Lieutenant
Governor in the total sum of ~ri3,076.53." Construed liberally,
, the petition demanded
as must be done (Code Civ. Proc. §
payment for overtime work for which compensation in some
form had been promised. Under the circumstances, it cannot
be said that the variance is so material as to require a reversal
of the judgment. (Hayes v,
Oil Corp., 38 Cal.2d 375,
382 [240 P.2d 580] .)
Although there is no evidence to support the finding that
Miss 'l'reu was promised compensating time off for overtime
work, the record includes evidence tending to prove an
agreement for payment in cash for work beyond normal
office hours. However, the respondents argue that the judgment cannot be sustained upon this theory because no such
contract was approved by the Department of Finance as required by statute.
Miss Treu was appointed under the authority of section
12101 of the Government Code which provides: ''The Lieutenant Governor may appoint
subject to the approval of the
Director of :B'inance, fix the salaries of one secretary and such
clerical assistants as the Lieutenant Governor deems necessary
for his office.'' 'I'he salary basis fixed by the lieutenant governor for Miss Treu and
by the director of finance
was one for monthly compensation without any authorization
of additional payment for overtime.
Miss Treu contends that no approval by the Department of
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i''inance is necessary to permit the payment of compensation
for overtime. Her position, however, is directly contrary to the
express provisions of section 18004 of the Government Code.
At the time she commenced her employment, that section read:
"Unless the Legislature specifically provides that approval of
the Department of Finance is not required, whenever any State
agency . . . fixes the salary or compensation of an employee
. . . which salary is payable in whole or in part out of State
funds, the salary is subject to the approval of the Department
of li'inance before it becomes effective and payable.'' The
office of lieutenant governor is included within the term ''State
agency." (Gov. Code, § 11000.)
[ 4] 'l'he words "salary" and "compensation" are, in
general usage, interchangeable and are synonymous in most
definitions. "Compensation" is " [ t ]he remuneration or wages
given to an employee or, especially, to an officer. Salary,
pay, or emolument." (Black's Law Diet., 4th ed., p.
354.) Likewise, "salary" is defined as "a stated compensation, amounting to so much by the year, month, or other
fixed period, to be paid to public officers and persons in
some private employments, for the performance of official
duties or the rendering of services of a particular kind.''
(Black's Law Diet., 4th ed., p. 1503.) "While the term
salary in its original and strict sense signifies a fixed
compensation it is frequently used in our constitution and
laws as the equivalent of compensation." (Mart~~n v. County
of Santa Barbara, 105 Cal. 208, 212 [38 P. 687] .)
[ 5] From the wording o£ section 18004 read with reference
to related statutory provisions, it is obvious that "salary"
and ''compensation'' are there used as being synonymous.
Section 13070 of the Government Code provides that the Department o£ Finance ''has general powers of supervision over
all matters concerning the financial and business policies of
the State." [6] The purpose of the latter section "is to
conserve the financial interests of the state, to prevent improvidence, and to control the expenditure of state money
by any of the several departments of the state. (Ireland v.
Riley, 11 Cal.App.2d 70, 72 [52 P.2d 1021].)" (State v.
Brotherhood of R. Trainmen, 37 Cal.2d 412, 422 [232 P.2d
857] .) [7] Therefore, a contract fixing rates of pay and
working conditions, which has not been approved by the
department in accordance with section 18004, is invalid. (State
v. Brotherhood of R. Trainmen, supra.)
42 C.2d-20
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the
for the departcontracts for ''compensation'' and
"salary" is
reference to section 13370 of the
Government
at the time Miss Treu was hired,
provided: ''All contracts entered into by any state agency
. . . for services . . . are of no effect unless and until approved by the Department of Finance." Under this section, a
contract to pay Miss Treu for her services beyond normal
working hours, regardless of whether payment be considered
''compensation'' or ''salary,'' or
would be invalid if
lacking the approval specified by the statute.
In her petition in this proceeding, Miss Treu did not allege
that the Department of :B'inance had authorized the payment
to her of any amount for overtime work. The respondents
pleaded in defense of her claim that no such authorization
had been made.
[9a] rrhe evidence concerning the action taken by the Department of Finance shows that while Miss Treu 's claim was
pending before the controller, several letters were written
to the controller regarding it. Although in some of them,
a request was made to the controller to withhold payment
pending the determination by the department of certain facts,
none of them placed the request upon the ground that the
department had not given its approval to the working of extra
hours. From this correspondence, it might reasonably be
inferred that the department tacitly approved the claim except for the specific irregularities mentioned. One letter
to the controller referred to an opinion of the attorney general listing the items necessary to establish the validity of
the claim. Included in these prerequisites was proof "that
the employee was authorized to and did work the extra hours
claimed.'' The department stated to the controller that the
authorizations enumerated by the attorney general "have
been substantiated, and there is available in our files the
required letters and affidavits making the required substantiation.'' Although the documents received in evidence tend to
show that the authorization to which reference was made ·was
only that of the lieutenant governor, they do not compel that
conclusion, and it might reasonably be inferred that the department had also approved the arrangement made by him.
On the other hand, there is evidence from which it reasonably could be concluded that the department gave no such
approval. Fred W. Links, Assistant Director of Finance and
chief of the division of budgets and accounts, was a witness
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for Miss Treu. He testified that his division handled her
claim. Asked if the Department of Finance approved it, he
answered that the function of his division was not to pass
upon its validity; " [w] hat we did was merely to
to the
State Controller, as we had requested him to withhold
thereof until we had
the drawing of the warrant for
substantiated the facts.'' Asked if the department fixed or
approved
compensation for Miss Treu other than on
her regular monthly basis, or if it fixed or provided for compensating time off for overtime hours, he replied that it did
not do so. Although this testimony tends strongly to show
a lack of approval, it too is not conclusive upon the issue.
It may be that Links was speaking of a formal approval;
also, there might have been a departmental approval made
without his knowledge.
Miss Treu pleaded and tried her case entirely upon a
theory of contract but she now contends that no promise
of time off was necessary to entitle her to recover. She
concedes that section 18005 of the Government Code, authorizing payment upon separation for accumulated overtime, was inapplicable to employees exempt from civil service
during the period in question. However, she refers to Government Code, sections 18023 and 18024, and rule 133 of the
Personnel Board which provide for the adoption of rules
governing hours of work and the granting of time off in lieu
of cash compensation for overtime. But she does not claim,
nor does the record indicate, that she was within those statutory or regulatory provisions or that any statute entitled
her to payment for overtime. Instead, she argues that no
statutory authority is essential to permit her recovery. This
point has been decided adversely to her in Martin v. Henderson, supra.
[10] In the absenee of either a valid contract or statute,
there is no basis for a recovery by Miss Treu. Her monthly
salary was payment in full for all of her services, without
regard to the number of hours which she worked. (Martin
v. Henderson, stlpra; Jarvis v. Henderson, 40 Cal.2d 600
[255 P.2d 426] ; Robinson v. Dunn, 77 Cal. 473 [19 P. 878, 11
Am.St.Rep. 297].)
[9b] In summary, from the evidence presented, conflicting
inferences could be drawn as to whether or not the Department
of Finance has approved Miss Treu 's claim. The issue is
essential to a determination of this proceeding. It should
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have been alleged in the petition for mandate and determined
by the findings. (Of. Delany v. Toomey, 111 Cal.App.2d
570, 571-573 [245 P.2d 26] .) However, no such finding was
made. The trial court found that all of the allegations of
the petition are true. But Miss Treu did not charge that her
claim was for overtime approved by the department. The
answer asserted, by way of defense, that there was no such
approval, and the allegations in each paragraph of the answer
were found to be untrue only ''so far as they deny the
allegations in" the particular paragraph of the petition being
answered.
The situation then is that the issue as to approval by the
department of finance, fully pleaded in the respondent's
answer, ·was not considered by Miss Treu or the trial judge
to be the determinative factor basic to any recovery. Her
position, undoubtedly taken in reliance upon the Clark and
Howard decisions, which since have been disapproved, waE
that authorization by the Department of Finance was not a
prerequisite. In her brief she says : ''The court is reminded
that there was no legal requirement for the Department of
Finance to approve the working hours of petitioner or the
approving of compensation for overtime.''
The memorandum opinion of the trial judge clearly shows
that he did not believe that a promise to pay an employee
additional compensation for extra time must be approved by
the Department of Finance to make the state liable for the
payment of it. As he construed section 18004 of the Government Code, it requires approval by the Department of Finance
only of salary. "It is true," he said "that the statute states
'salary or compensation' but later each one of the clauses
refers only to the word 'salary'. 'l'his court does not feel
that that statute is subject to the broad interpretation which
respondent puts upon it. We are of the opinion that the words
'salary or compensation' are used as interchangeable terms,
but that a lump sum to be paid in lieu of compensating time
off is not such 'compensation' as is meant there.'' Undoubtedly, that construction of the statute is the reason why
no finding as to the approval by the department was made.
[11] Although an appellate court is empowered to make
findings of fact and to take evidence in support of a judgment (Code Civ. Proc., § 956a), generally it will not do so
when the evidence before the trial court is conflicting. (People
v. One 194D Ford V-8 Coupe, 41 Cal.2d 123, 127 [257 P.2d
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. ) This latter rule is not without exception ( cf. J okndrow v. Thomas, 31 Cal.2d 202, 207 [187 P.2d 681); Gudger
v.
21 Cal.2d 537, 547 [134 P.2d 217]), but where,
as in the present case, the evidence in favor of one party
is not clearly persuasive, and there is no indication as to
the trial judge's appraisal of the evidence, the judgment
should be reversed for a new trial in order that there may
be a finding upon the issue.
'rhe judgment is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
The judicial history of this case should be of interest
to the public as well as to practicing attorneys. Miss Treu
filed a petition for a writ of mandate to compel payment to
her by the controller and treasurer of the State of California of compensation for overtime promised her by her
employer, Lieutenant Governor Knight, now Governor" of the
state. Her petition was granted by the trial court and affirmed
by the District Court of Appeal. ( (Cal.App.) 240 P.2d 32.)
This court granted the state's petition for hearing and rendered its first decision on April 3, 1953. That decision, which
reversed the trial court, held that the contract entered into
between 1\{iss Treu and her employer was invalid for lack
of approval by the Department of :F'inance. Mr. Justice
Schauer and I flied separate dissenting opinions. On May 1,
1953, this court granted a rehearing with Chief Justice Gibson,
Justices Shenk, Schauer and me voting therefor.
The present opinion holds, in accordance with my former
dissent, that the evidence presented is sufficient to show a
tacit or implied approval by the department of finance of
the contract entered into between Miss Treu and her employrr, the then lieutenant governor. In direct conflict with
the former opinion, it is now held by a majority of this court
that ''conflicting inferences could be drawn as to whether
or not the Department of Finance has approved Miss Treu 's
claim. The issue is essential to a determination of this proceeding." In the former opinion, the majority did not even
recognize that there was any evidence tending to show an
approval by the department. The record is the same now as
it was then. However, the majority now reverse on the
ground that the trial court made no finding as to departmental
approval or lack thereof. With this I cannot agree.

614

TREU

1).

KmKwooD

[42 C.2d

:B'lorenz
was a former employee
uf the former lieutenant governor. She was appointed secreon JYiarch
1947, and served in that position until
JYiarch 1st,
when she was appointed to the position of
executive
On August
1949, she terminated
her
with the lieutenant governor. She was
exempt,
her tenure in both
from civil service and its
After the termination of her employment, she
mandate proceedings in the Superior
Court of Sacramento County against the state controller
and state treasurer to compel them to allow a claim filed
by her against the state in the sum of $3,076.53. This sum
represented the cash value of compensating time off which
she alleged had been promised her for overtime worked while
she was employed by the lieutenant governor but which had
not been received by her prior to her separation. 'l'he state
appeals from a judgment directing that the claim be paid.
Section 12101 of the Government Code provides that "The
Lieutenant Governor may appoint and, subject to the approval of the Director of Finance, fix the salaries of one
secretary and such clerical assistants as the Lieutenant
Governor deems necessary for his office.'' During the time
JYiiss Treu worked for the lieutenant governor, her salary was
fixed with the approval of the Department of Finance on a
monthly basis in amounts which progressively increased from
$275 per month to $436 per month. This salary has all
been paid. Regular hours of work were established by the
lieutenant governor as follows: 9 a. m. to 5 :30 p. m., Mondays through Fridays, and 9 a. m. to 12 noon on Saturdays.
JYiiss Treu kept a record showing the extra hours she worked
and these were recorded on the monthly attendance report
forms. The extra hours were authorized to be worked by the
lieutenant governor and were supported by Authorization for
Overtime Form 682. After separation from her employment
without having been paid for the overtime work and without having received compensating time off, Miss Treu prepared a claim for payment which was approved by the State
Personnel Board and, when later presented to the state controller was by him rejected. 'l'hereafter these proceedings
were commenced.
The state first contends that the finding of the trial court
that JYiiss Treu was promised compensating time off for
overtime work is not supported by the evidence. It is
argued that the promise made to JYiiss Treu was not for com-

Apr.1954]

TREU

v.

KIRKWOOD

615

[42 C.2d 602; 268 P.2d 4821

pensating time off but for a cash payment in lieu thereof.
'l'his argument has merit. The record shows that Miss Treu
was told by the lieutenant governor that due to the pressure
of work it would be impossible for her to take time off but
that she would be
for her overtime work. This testimony
was substantiated
a letter from the lieutenant governor
to the Department of Finance. The state contends that this
constitutes a failure of
and cites, as authority, Gillin
v. Hopkins, 28 Cal.App. 579 [153 P. 724], wherein it was
held that evidence of a contract to accept payment in stock
constituted failure of proof of a cause of action upon an
agreement to pay a designated sum of money. It is provided,
however, in section 469 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that
no variance between the allegation in a pleading and the
proof is to be deemed material unless it has actually misled
the adverse party to his prejudice in maintaining his action
or defense on the merits. Miss Treu 's petition alleged that
she was entitled to be paid in cash for overtime work and
the state could not have been misled inasmuch as it introduced evidence tending to prove that no contract made
with Miss Treu for payment for overtime work had been
approved by the Department of Finance. vVe said in Hayes
v. Richfield Oil Corp., 38 Cal.2d 375, 382 [240 P.2d 580],
that " [a] variance between the allegations of a pleading and
the proof will not be deemed material unless it has actually
misled the adverse party to his prejudice in maintaining
his action or defense on the merits, and a variation may be
disregarded where the action has been as fully and fairly
tried on the merits as though the variance had not existed.''
And in Chelini v. Nieri, 32 Cal.2d 480, 486 [196 P.2d 915],
v;e said: "that a variance is immaterial and may be disregarded where the case was as fully and fairly tried upon
the merits as though the variance had not existed." In view
of the pleading heretofore referred to and the proof adduced
by both parties, it is at once apparent that the state was not
misled to its prejudice. Further, the evidence is more than
sufficient to show that Miss Treu was promised compensation
for overtime work by the lieutenant governor.
The state argues, however, that no snch contract is valid
unless approved by the Department of Finance as required
by the provision:o; of section 18004 of the Government Code
(as the section read at the time she began work). That section provides that "Unless the Legislature specifically pro-
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vides that approval of the Department of Finance is not
required, whenever any State agency [in which the office of
Lieutenant Governor is included, Gov. Code, § 11000] . . .
fixes the salary or compensation of an employee . . . which
salary is payable in whole or in part out of State funds, the
salary is subject to the approval of the Department of
Finance before it becomes effective and payable.''
It may be taken for granted that the words "salary" and
''compensation'' are synonymous for the purpose of this discussion. (Martin v. County of Santa Barbara, 105 Cal. 208,
212 [38 P. 687].)
In State v. Brotherhood of R. 'Trainmen, 37 Cal.2d 412, 421,
422 [232 P.2d 857], it was held that a state agency could not
bind the state for wages or salary without the approval of the
Department of Finance. The question of approval by the Department of Finance was the subject of conflicting evidence.
In support of the determination reached by the trier of fact
that Miss 'l'reu was entitled to compensation for overtime, the
record contains a letter from the state attorney general to the
Department of Finance in which he set forth seven facts upon
which he felt the validity of Miss Treu 's claim rested. He
wrote '' [w] hether or not the claim is valid under the rule of
that case [Clark v. State Personnel Board, 56 Cal.App.2d 499
( 133 P .2d 11)] is dependent, in addition to the facts shown
above, upon the existence of the following facts : ( 1) that the
lieutenant governor did establish normal hours of work for
the employee; (2) that he did promise the employee compensating time off for extra hours worked; (3) that this promise
was made prior to the time they were worked; ( 4) that the
employee was authorized to and did work the extra hours
claimed; ( 5) that she did not receive compensating time off or
other compensation for these extra hours; (6) that she did not
waive the overtime by failing to take compensating time off
when offered, and finally (7) that the amount claimed is the
cash equivalent of the uncompensated overtime.'' On February 14, 1950, the letter of the attorney general was forwarded to the controller together with an interdepartmental
communication signed by ,James Dean, director of finance, in
which he referred to the attorney general's letter stating that
the "seven items which he set forth in his letter already have
been substantiated, and there is available in our files the required letters and affidavits making the required substantiation.'' It is argued that these communications constituted a
tacit approval by the department of Miss 'l'reu's claim for pay-
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ment for overtime. 'l'he statute (Gov. Code, § 18004) provides
that the required approval by the department must only be
had before the compensation promised "becomes effective and
payable'' and does not provide that the approval must be had
in advance of the time worked for which compensation is
promised. Mr. Links, assistant director of finance, in response
to a question as to whether the department had approved the
claim, testified that '' [ w] hat ~we did was merely to report to
the State Controller, as we had requested him to withhold the
drawing of the warrant for the payment thereof until we had
substantiated the facts." Thereafter, on February 14th, as
has been hereinbefore set forth, a letter was written by the
department to the controller in which it was stated "there is
available in our files the reqttired letters and affidavits making
the required s~tbstantiation." I am satisfied that it can be inferred from this evidence that the conduct of the Department
of Finance amounted to an approval of the agreement for overtime pay between Miss Treu and the lieutenant governor.
The state relies upon section 13370 of the Government Code
in support of its contention that ''All contracts entered into
by any state agency . . . for services shall not be effective
unless and until approved by the Department of Finance."
This section adds nothing to the discussion heretofore had.
As has been seen, the department impliedly approved Miss
Treu 's claim for overtime compensation and the trial court
so found. In this regard it should be noted that Miss Treu
alleged in Paragraph XII all the facts necessary to show that
the Department of Finance approved her claim. She alleged
"That on the 14th day of February, 1950, the said James S.
Dean informed the respondent, Thomas H. Kuchel, that certain
facts necessary to be established to make said claim valid had
been substantiated and that there was available in the files
of said James S. Dean the required letters and affidavits making the required substantiation. The facts so substantiated and
established are :
'' 1. That the said Lieutenant Governor did establish normal
hours of work for petitioner;
"2. That said Lieutenant Governor did promise petitioner
compensating time off for extra hours worked;
'' 3. That said promise was made prior to the time said hours
were worked;
'' 4. That petitioner was authorized to and did work the extra
hours claimed;
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did not reeeive
time oil'
"5.
or other
of separation;
"6. That petitioner did not waive the extra hours claimed
by failure to take
time off for said hours when
offered;
"7. The amount claimed is the cash
of the uncompensated overtime.''
In addition, all the substantiating facts are alleged. 'l'lie
trial court found the allegations of this paragraph to be true
and, in addition, found that the allegations of the answer denying the same were untrue. These findings are sufficient to
establish the implied approval of the department. In holding
that this is not a sufficient finding on the issue of approval by
the department of finance, a majority of this court is, by a
highly technical and wholly unnecessary construction thereof,
depriving a working person of wages earned for work done
honestly and conscientiously in reliance upon the promise of
one of the highest ofi1cers of this state. It is at once apparent
from a reading of the reporter's transcript as it relates the
testimony of Mr. Links, Assistant Director of Finance, on
direct and cross-examination, that the case was tried on the
theory that approval by the Department of Finance was at
ISSUe.

It is next argued that where a public employee has a fixed
monthly salary there can be no such thing as ''extra'' hours,
or days, as a basis for overtime pay, and that Miss Treu 's
monthly salary was the only compensation to which she was
entitled. Robinson v. Dnnn, 77 Cal. 473 [19 P. 878, 11 Am.
St.Rep. 297], is relied upon in support of this contention. In
the Robinson case, the Legislature sought to authorize additional payment for certain employees whose wages were fixed
by law at $4.00 per clay because these employees were obliged
to work 16 hours per day rather than the hours comprising a
normal working day. It was there held that the word "day"
''as used in the statute, covers whatever period of the twentyfour hours the legislators choose to remain in session. . . . 'rhe
services, therefore, were not 'extra,' but were such as the
employees were bound to render." The situation in the Robinson case is not analogous to the one under consideration. In
the instant case, Miss Treu was ordered to work overtime and
promised additional compensation therefor. The state's argument that" [t]he length of the work day and of the work week
having been in the discretion of the appointing power, the
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work month for which he was paid covers whatever part of the
month that the
power required him to work" and
" [t] he
therefore, which petitioner here claims she
worked were not '
' but were such as she was bound to
render for her fixed
' shows that the present
situation differs from that of the Robinson case. The overtime
hours worked
Miss Treu were, in effect, such as would be
worked
an extra
since the appointing power-the
her that she would receive
extra
fixed
hours of vvork. 'rhe rule announced in Howard
87
449 [197 P.2d 69], and Clark v.
499 [133 P.2d 11], now
opinions in Martin v. Henderson
and Redwine v. HencleTson
Cal.2d 583 [255 P.2d 416})
was in full force and effect during the time Miss Treu worked
for the lieutenant govenwr and during the time this case has
been under judicial review. The disapproval of the rule that
a state einployee, in the absence of statutory authority, is entitled to
for accrued overtime upon separation from
should not be permitted to operate retroactively so as
to
Miss Treu of a vested right. In Hildebrand v. State
Bar, 36 Cal.2d
514
P.2d 508], this court said: " . . .
it is our conclusion that the ends of justice will be served by
dismissing the
without disciplinary action,
permitting this
as the first expression of the
vie1vs of this court upon the
to serve prospectively as
a guide to the members of the profession generally, rather than
to serve retrospectively to the detriment of petitioners." A
262 points out that the gennote in 85 American Law
eral principle is that a decision of a court of supreme jurisdiction overruling a former decision is retrospective in its
operation, and the efrect is not that the former decision was
bad law, but that it never vvas the law. It is also noted, however, that to this the courts have established the exception
that, where a constitutional or statute law has received a given
construction by the courts of last resort, and contracts have
been made and rights acquired under and in accordance with
such construction, such contracts may not be invalidated nor
vested rights acquired under them impaired by a change of
eonstruction made by a subsequent decision. ''The true rule
in sueh cases is held to be to
a change of judicial construction in respect to a statute the same effect in its operation on
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contracts and existing contract rights that would be given to
a legislative repeal or amendment; that is to say, make it prospective, btd not 1·etroactive." (Emphasis added.) (See, also,
People v. IYlaughs, 149 Cal. 253 [86 P. 187]; People v. Ryan,
152 Cal. 364 [92 P. 853] .) Good faith and fair dealing by
state officers should not only be presumed, but enforced. To
hold that the disapproval of the cited cases operates retroactively deprives Miss Treu of compensation for services rendered in good faith in reliance upon not only the promise of
her employer (which was impliedly approved by the Department of Finance) who held one of the highest offices in this
state, but in reliance upon decisions rendered by the highest
judicial tribunals of this state. Neither Miss Treu, her attorney, nor the trial court or the District Court of Appeal could
have known that Howard v. Larn.pton, S1tpra, and Clark v.
State Personnel Board, supra, were to be disapproved in
Martin v. Henderson and Redwine v. Henderson, supra. If this
case was tried on the theory of the rule laid down in those
cases, this court should not now penalize Miss Treu for having
done so but should construe the pleadings and the findings
liberally to the end that justice would be accomplished.
The final contention made by the state is that Miss Treu was
paid in full for all overtime by a special salary adjustment
granted her with the approval of the Department of Finance.
On July 16, 1947, the lieutenant governor wrote to Mr. Links of
the Department of Finance that the ''salaries'' of his employees should be increased to certain specified amounts for
the year. The trial court found that Miss Treu did not receive
compensation for the overtime hours worked. There is ample
evidence in the record in support of that finding and the implication is clear that the fixed salary received by Miss Treu
was to cover her fixed hours of work in view of the express
promise of her employer, the lieutenant governor, to compensate her for overtime worked.
Other points raised by the state do not merit discussion
inasmuch as there are really only two primary issues involved
-whether or not the lieutenant governor and Miss Treu entered into a contract for the payment to her of extra compensation for overtime work and whether or not that contract was
approved by the Department of Finance. On both of these
issues, the trial court found in her favor and there is ample
evidence in support thereof.
For the foregoing reasons, I feel compelled to say that
the present majority holding in this case results in a totally
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unnecessary miscarriage of justice and does nothing to promote respect for the fair dealing of a prominent state official
who has been prevented from keeping his word which was
given in sincerity and honesty in return for work conscientiously done.
I would affirm the judgment.
SHENK, J., and SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-In our view
the evidence adequately supports the essential findings and
such findings, construed favorable to the judgment (see
Richter v. Walker (1951), 36 Oal.2d 634,640 [226 P.2d 593]),
are sufficient to sustain it. Accordingly we would affirm the
judgment.
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'l'HE PEOPLE, Appellant, v. WESTERN AIR LINES,
INC. (a Corporation), Respondent.
[1] Public Utilities-Nature of Functions of Commission.-Under
the Constitution and statutes of this state the Public Utilities
Commission is possessed of broad and comprehensive powers;
it has wide administrative powers, legislative power, such
as fixing of rates of public utilities, and judicial powers.
[2] !d.-Orders of Commission-Conclusiveness.-When determinations of Public Utilities Commission within its jurisdiction
have become final, they are conclusive in all collateral actions
and proceedings. (Pub. Util. Code, § 1709.)
[3] !d.-Orders of Commission-Judicial Review.-Direct attack
on determinations of Public Utilities Commission is made
available by application for writ of review to Supreme Court
in accordance with Pub. Uti!. Code, § 1756.
[1] See Cal.Jur., Public Utilities and Services, § 35 et seq.; Am.
Jur., Public Utilities and Services, § 193 et s.eq.
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